Transparency Without Resonance: Litigation Risk Disclosure and Market Apathy in Indonesia’s Capital Market
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.58777/rbm.v3i2.486Keywords:
litigation disclosure, transparency, signaling theory, capital market, IndonesiaAbstract
This study examines the gap between litigation risk disclosure and market responsiveness in Indonesia's capital markets. Although Law No. 8 of 1995 and POJK No. 29/POJK.04/2016 require issuers to disclose material legal risks, findings show such announcements rarely affect stock prices or investor behavior. Using a mixed normative–empirical method, the research combines legal analysis with simulated event studies and content analysis of disclosures from five issuers between 2020 and 2024. Results indicate most disclosures are vague and non-quantitative, omitting claim values, probability of loss, or operational impacts, thereby weakening informational value and salience. Event study results reveal no significant abnormal returns in a ±5-day window around disclosure dates, challenging the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). To explain these outcomes, the study employs EMH, signaling theory, salience theory, and legal materiality, explaining why transparency fails to drive reactions. Contributing factors include the absence of binding standards, under-disclosure to avoid reputational harm, and weak investor literacy. Recommendations include standardized disclosure formats, quantification, stronger audits, and enhanced investor education. By framing transparency as both a legal and behavioral issue, the study proposes a framework to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of litigation risk communication in emerging markets.
References
Beyer, A., Cohen, D., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2018). The economics of voluntary, mandatory, and selective disclosures. *Journal of Accounting and Economics, 65*(2–3), 207–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.002
Bordalo, P., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2013). Salience and consumer choice. *Journal of Political Economy, 121*(5), 803–843. https://doi.org/10.1086/673885
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. *Journal of Financial Economics, 14*(1), 3–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(85)90042-X
Chen, J., Cheng, Q., & Lo, A. K. (2021). The information role of financial reporting in debt contracting and equity valuation. *Journal of Accounting Research, 59*(2), 397–442. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12339
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021). Capital-market effects of securities regulation: Prior conditions, implementation, and enforcement. *Review of Financial Studies, 34*(9), 4561–4606. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab046
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2023). Mandatory disclosure and its effects. *Journal of Accounting Research, 61*(2), 345–389. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12413
Edmans, A., Gosling, T., & Jenter, D. (2022). CEO compensation: Evidence from the field. *Journal of Financial Economics, 146*(2), 312–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.07.006
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. *The Journal of Finance, 25*(2), 383–417. https://doi.org/10.2307/2325486
Haß, L. H., & Müller, M. A. (2022). Disclosure regulation and market efficiency: Evidence from EU reforms. *European Accounting Review, 31*(5), 881–915. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2021.2004130
Kraakman, R., Armour, J., Davies, P. L., Hansmann, H., Hertig, G., Hopt, K. J., Kanda, H., & Rock, E. B. (2017). *The anatomy of corporate law: A comparative and functional approach* (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.001.0001
Krüger, P., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L. T. (2021). The importance of climate risks for institutional investors. *Review of Financial Studies, 33*(3), 1067–1111. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz137
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. *Journal of Political Economy, 106*(6), 1113–1155. https://doi.org/10.1086/250042
Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P. (2016). The economics of disclosure and financial reporting regulation: Evidence and suggestions for future research. *Journal of Accounting Research, 54*(2), 525–622. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12115
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2016). *Peraturan OJK No. 29/POJK.04/2016 tentang Laporan Tahunan Emiten atau Perusahaan Publik*. https://jdih.ojk.go.id/peraturan/POJK-29-POJK.04-2016
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2022). *Statistik Pasar Modal Indonesia 2022*. https://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/pasar-modal/data-dan-statistik/statistik-pasar-modal/default.aspx
Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2009). Shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior. *Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47*(1–2), 136–156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.09.001
Shiller, R. J. (2000). *Irrational exuberance*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400825476
Skinner, D. J. (1997). Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits. *Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23*(3), 249–282. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(97)00010-4
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87*(3), 355–374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/438/
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001). Essays on disclosure. *Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32*(1–3), 97–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00025-8
Wang, K. T., & Zhou, J. (2016). Litigation risk and corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from China. *The Accounting Review, 91*(5), 1541–1575. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51357
Xu, S., & Zeng, C. (2020). Corporate litigation disclosure and investor reactions: Evidence from China. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56*(9), 2092–2110. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2019.1668768
Zhou, J., & Lobo, G. J. (2021). The economic consequences of disclosure quality. *Accounting Horizons, 35*(1), 85–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00262
Zingales, L. (2000). In search of new foundations. *The Journal of Finance, 55*(4), 1623–1653. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00262
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section

